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Abstract. Sosemanuk is a new synchronous software-oriented stream
cipher, corresponding to Profile 1 of the ECRYPT call for stream cipher
primitives. Its key length is variable between 128 and 256 bits. It ac-
commodates a 128-bit initial value. Any key length is claimed to achieve
128-bit security. The Sosemanuk cipher uses both some basic design
principles from the stream cipher SNOW 2.0 and some transformations
derived from the block cipher SERPENT. Sosemanuk aims at improv-
ing SNOW 2.0 both from the security and from the efficiency points of
view. Most notably, it uses a faster IV-setup procedure. It also requires
a reduced amount of static data, yielding better performance on several
architectures.
1 Introduction
This paper presents a proposal for a new synchronous software-oriented
stream cipher, named Sosemanuk. The Sosemanuk cipher uses both
basic design principles from the stream cipher SNOW 2.0 [12] and trans-
formations derived from the block cipher SERPENT [3]. For this reason,
its name should refer both to SERPENT and SNOW. However, it is well-
known that snow snakes do not exist since snakes either hibernate or
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move to warmer climes during the winter.Instead Sosemanuk is a pop-
ular sport played by the Eastern Canadian tribes. It consists in throwing
a wooden stick along a snow bank as far as possible. Its name means
snowsnake in the Cree language, since the stick looks like a snake in the
snow. Kwakweco-cime win is a variant of the same game but does not
sound like an appropriate cipher name. More details on the Sosemanuk
game and a demonstration can be found in [19] and [24].
The Sosemanuk stream cipher is a new synchronous stream cipher
dedicated to software applications. Its key length is variable between 128
and 256 bits. Any key length is claimed to achieve 128-bit security. It is
inspired by the design of SNOW 2.0 which is very elegant and achieves
a very high throughput on a Pentium 4. Sosemanuk aims at improving
SNOW 2.0 from two respects. First, it avoids some structural properties
which may appear as potential weaknesses, even if the SNOW 2.0 cipher
with a 128-bit key resists all known attacks. Second, efficiency is improved
on several architectures by reducing the internal state size, thus allowing
for a more direct mapping of data on the processor registers. Sosemanuk
also requires a reduced amount of static data; this lower data cache pres-
sure yields better performance on several architectures. Another strength
of Sosemanuk is that its key setup procedure is based on a reduced
version of the well-known block cipher SERPENT, improving classical
initialization procedures both from an efficiency and a security point of
view.
2 Specification
2.1 SERPENT and derivatives
SERPENT [3] is a block cipher proposed as an AES candidate. SERPENT
operates over blocks of 128 bits which are split into four 32-bit words,
which are then combined in so-called “bitslice” mode. SERPENT can
thus be defined as working over quartets of 32-bit words. We number
SERPENT input and output quartets from 0 to 3, and write them in
the order: (Y3, Y2, Y1, Y0). Y0 is the least significant word, and contains
the least significant bits of the 32 4-bit inputs to the SERPENT S-boxes.
When SERPENT output is written into 16 bytes, the Yi values are written
following the little-endian convention (least significant byte first), and Y0
is output first, then Y1, and so on.
From SERPENT, we define two primitives called Serpent1 and Ser-
pent24.
Serpent1 A SERPENT rounds consist of, in that order:
– a subkey addition, by bitwise exclusive or;
– S-box application (which is expressed as a set of bitwise combinations
between the four running 32-bit words, in bitslice mode);
– a linear bijective transformation (which amounts to a few XORs, shifts
and rotations in bitslice mode), see Appendix A.2.
Serpent1 is one round of SERPENT, without the key addition and the
linear transformation. SERPENT uses eight distinct S-boxes (see A.1 for
details), numbered from S0 to S7 on 4-bit words. We define Serpent1 as
the application of S2, in bitslice mode. This is the third S-box layer of
SERPENT. Serpent1 takes four 32-bit words as input, and provides four
32-bit words as output.
Serpent24 Serpent24 is SERPENT reduced to 24 rounds, instead of the
32 rounds of the full version of SERPENT. Serpent24 is equal to the first
24 rounds of SERPENT, where the last round (the 24th) is a complete
one and includes a complete round with the linear transformation and an
XOR with the 25th subkey. In other words, the 24th round of Serpent24
is thus equivalent to the thirty-second round of SERPENT, except that
it contains the linear transformation and that the 24th and 25th subkeys
are used (32nd and 33rd subkeys in SERPENT). Thus, the last round
equation on Page 224 in [3] is
R23(X) = L
(
Sˆ23(X ⊕ Kˆ23)
)
⊕ Kˆ24 .
Serpent24 uses only 25 128-bit subkeys, which are the first 25 subkeys
produced by the SERPENT key schedule. In Sosemanuk, Serpent24 is
used for the initialization step, only in encryption mode. Decryption is
not used.
2.2 The LFSR
Underlying finite field Most of the stream cipher internal state is held
in a LFSR containing 10 elements of F232 , the field with 2
32 elements.
The elements of F232 are represented exactly as in SNOW 2.0. We recall
this representation here. Let F2 denote the finite field with 2 elements.
Let β be a root of the primitive polynomial:
Q(X) = X8 +X7 +X5 +X3 + 1
on F2[X]. We define the field F28 as the quotient F2[X]/Q(X). Each
element in F28 is represented using the basis (β
7, β6, ...β, 1). Since the
chosen polynomial is primitive, then β is a multiplicative generator of all
invertible elements of F28 : every non-zero element in F28 is equal to β
k
for some integer k (0 ≤ k ≤ 254). Any element in F28 is identified with
an 8-bit integer by the following bijection:
φ : F28 → {0, 1, . . . , 255}
x =
∑
7
i=0 xiβ
i 7→
∑
7
i=0 xi2
i
where each xi is either 0 or 1. For instance, β
23 is represented by the
integer φ(β23) = 0xE1 (in hexadecimal).Therefore, the addition of two
elements in F28 corresponds to a bitwise XOR between the corresponding
integer representations. The multiplication by β is a left shift by one bit
of the integer representation, followed by an XOR with a fixed mask if
the most significant bit dropped by the shift equals 1.
Let α be a root of the primitive polynomial
P (X) = X4 + β23X3 + β245X2 + β48X + β239
on F28 [X]. The field F232 is then defined as the quotient F28[X]/P (X),
i.e., its elements are represented with the basis (α3, α2, α, 1). Any element
in F232 is identified with a 32-bit integer by the following bijection:
ψ : F232 → {0, 1, . . . , 2
32 − 1}
y =
∑
3
i=0 yiα
i 7→
∑
3
i=0 φ(yi)2
8i
Thus, the addition of two elements in F232 corresponds to a bitwise XOR
between their integer representations. This operation will hereafter be
denoted by ⊕. Sosemanuk also uses multiplications and divisions of ele-
ments in F232 by α. Multiplication of z ∈ F232 by α corresponds to a left
shift by 8 bits of ψ(z), followed by an XOR with a 32-bit mask which
depends only on the most significant byte of ψ(z). Division of z ∈ F232
by α is a right shift by 8 bits of ψ(z), followed by an XOR with a 32-bit
mask which depends only on the least significant byte of ψ(z).
Definition of the LFSR The LFSR operates over elements of F232 . The
initial state, at t = 0, entails the ten 32-bit values s1 to s10. At each step,
a new value is computed, with the following recurrence:
st+10 = st+9 ⊕ α
−1st+3 ⊕ αst, ∀t ≥ 1
and the register is shifted (see Figure 1 for an illustration of the LFSR).
α−1 α
stst+5st+9 st+3
Fig. 1. The LFSR
The LFSR is associated with the following feedback polynomial:
pi(X) = αX10 + α−1X7 +X + 1 ∈ F232 [X]
Since the LFSR is non-singular and since pi is a primitive polynomial,
the sequence of 32-bit words (st)t≥1 is periodic and has maximal period
(2320 − 1).
2.3 The Finite State Machine
The Finite State Machine (FSM) is a component with 64 bits of memory,
corresponding to two 32-bit registers R1 and R2. At each step, the FSM
takes as inputs some words from the LFSR state; it updates the memory
bits and produces a 32-bit output. The FSM operates on the LFSR state
at time t ≥ 1 as follows:
FSMt : (R1t−1, R2t−1, st+1, st+8, st+9) 7→ (R1t, R2t, ft)
where
R1t = (R2t−1 +mux(lsb(R1t−1), st+1, st+1 ⊕ st+8)) mod 2
32 (1)
R2t = Trans(R1t−1) (2)
ft = (st+9 +R1t mod 2
32)⊕R2t (3)
where lsb(x) is the least significant bit of x, mux(c, x, y) is equal to x if
c = 0, or to y if c = 1. The internal transition function Trans on F232 is
defined by
Trans(z) = (M × z mod 232)<<<7
where M is the constant value 0x54655307 (the hexadecimal expression
of the first ten decimals of pi) and <<<denotes bitwise rotation of a 32-bit
value (by 7 bits here).
2.4 Output transformation
The outputs of the FSM are grouped by four, and Serpent1 is applied to
each group; the result is then combined by XOR with the corresponding
dropped values from the LFSR, to produce the output values zt:
(zt+3, zt+2, zt+1, zt) = Serpent1 (ft+3, ft+2, ft+1, ft)⊕ (st+3, st+2, st+1, st)
Four consecutive rounds of Sosemanuk are depicted in Figure 2.
2.5 Sosemanuk workflow
The Sosemanuk cipher combines the FSM and the LFSR to produce the
output values zt. Time t = 0 designates the internal state after initializa-
tion; the first output value is z1. Figure 3 gives a graphical overview of
Sosemanuk.
At time t ≥ 1, we perform the following operations:
– The FSM is updated: R1t, R2t and the intermediate value ft are
computed from R1t−1, R2t−1, st+1, st+8 and st+9.
– The LFSR is updated: st+10 is computed, from st, st+3 and st+9. The
value st is sent to an internal buffer, and the LFSR is shifted.
Once every four steps, four output values zt, zt+1, zt+2 and zt+3 are
produced from the accumulated values ft, ft+1, ft+2, ft+3 and st, st+1, st+2, st+3.
Thus, Sosemanuk produces 32-bit values. We recommend encoding them
into groups of four bytes using the little-endian convention, because it is
faster on the most widely used high-end software platform (x86-compatible
PC), and because SERPENT uses that convention.
Therefore, the first four iterations of Sosemanuk are as follows.
– The LFSR initial state contains values s1 to s10; no value s0 is defined.
The FSM initial state contains R10 and R20.
– During the first step, R11, R21 and f1 are computed from R10, R20,
s2, s9 and s10.
– The first step produces the buffered intermediate values s1 and f1.
– During the first step, the feedback word s11 is computed from s10, s4
and s1, and the internal state of the LFSR is updated, leading to a
new state composed of s2 to s11.
– The first four output values are z1, z2, z3 and z4, and are computed
using one application of Serpent1 over (f4, f3, f2, f1), whose output is
combined by XORs with (s4, s3, s2, s1).
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Fig. 2. The output transformation on four consecutive rounds of Sosemanuk.
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Fig. 3. An overview of Sosemanuk
2.6 Key initialization and IV injection
The Sosemanuk initialization process is split into two steps:
– the key schedule, which processes the secret key but does not depend
on the IV; and
– the IV injection, which uses the output of the key schedule and the
IV. This initializes the stream cipher internal state.
Key schedule The key setup corresponds to the Serpent24 key schedule,
which produces 25 128-bit subkeys, as 100 32-bit words. These 25 128-bit
subkeys are identical to the first 25 128-bit subkeys produced by the plain
SERPENT key schedule.
SERPENT accepts any key length from 1 to 256 bits; hence, Sose-
manuk may work with exactly the same keys. However, since Sose-
manuk aims at 128-bit security; its key length must then be at least
128 bits. Therefore, 128 bits is the standard key length. Any key length
from 128 bits to 256 bits is supported. But, the security level still corre-
sponds to 128-bit security. In other words, using a longer secret key does
not guarantee to provide the security level usually expected from such a
key.
IV injection The IV is a 128-bit value. It is used as input to the Ser-
pent24 block cipher, as initialized by the key schedule. Serpent24 consists
of 24 rounds and the outputs of the 12th, 18th and 24th rounds are used.
We denote those outputs as follows:
– (Y 123 , Y
12
2 , Y
12
1 , Y
12
0 ): output of the 12th round;
– (Y 183 , Y
18
2 , Y
18
1 , Y
18
0 ): output of the 18th round;
– (Y 243 , Y
24
2 , Y
24
1 , Y
24
0 ): output of the 24th round.
The output of each round consists of the four 32-bit words just after
the linear transformation, except for the 24th round, for which the output
is taken just after the addition of the 25th subkey.
These values are used to initialize the Sosemanuk internal state, with
the following values:
(s7, s8, s9, s10) = (Y
12
3 , Y
12
2 , Y
12
1 , Y
12
0 )
(s5, s6) = (Y
18
1 , Y
18
3 )
(s1, s2, s3, s4) = (Y
24
3 , Y
24
2 , Y
24
1 , Y
24
0 )
R10 = Y
18
0
R20 = Y
18
2
3 Design rationale
3.1 Key initialization and IV injection
Underlying principle. A first property of the initialization process is that
it is split into two distinct steps: the key schedule which does not depend
on the IV, and the IV injection which generates the initial state of the
generator from the IV and from the output of the key schedule. Then,
the IV setup for a fixed key is less expensive than a complete key setup,
improving the common design since changing the IV is more frequent
than changing the secret key.
A second characteristic of Sosemanuk is that the IV setup is derived
from the application of a block cipher over the IV. If we consider the
function FK which maps a n-bit IV to the first n bits of output stream
generated from the key K and the IV, then FK must be computationaly
indistinguishable from a random function over Fn2 . Hence, the computa-
tion of FK cannot “morally” be faster than the best known PRF over n-bit
blocks. It so happens that the fastest known PRF use the same implemen-
tation techniques that the fastest known Pseudo-Random Permutations
(which are block ciphers), and amount to the equivalent performance.
Since Sosemanuk stream generation is very fast, the generation of n
stream bits takes little time compared to a computation of a robust PRP
over a block of n bits. Following this path of reasoning, we decided to use
a block cipher as the fundation of the IV setup for Sosemanuk: the IV
setup itself cannot be much faster than the application of a block cipher,
and the security requirements for that step are much similar to what is
expected from a block cipher.
Choice of the block cipher. The block cipher used in the IV setup is
derived from SERPENT for the following reasons:
– SERPENT has been thoroughly analyzed during the AES selection
process and its security is well-understood.
– SERPENT needs no static data tables, and hence adds little or no
data cache pressure.
– The SERPENT round function is optimized for operation over data
represented as 32-bit words, which is exactly how data is managed
within Sosemanuk. Using SERPENT implies no tedious byte ex-
traction from 32-bit words, or recombinations into such words.
– We needed a block cipher for the key schedule and IV injection; using
something other else than AES seems good for “biodiversity”.
Design of Serpent24. The IV injection uses a reduced version of SER-
PENT because SERPENT aimed at 256-bit security, whereas Sosemanuk
is meant for 128-bit security. The best linear bias and differential bias for
a 6-round version of SERPENT are 2−28 and 2−58 respectively [3]. Thus,
12 rounds should provide appropriate security. Twelve more rounds are
added in order to generate enough data (three 128-bit words are needed
for initializing Sosemanuk), hence 24 rounds for Serpent24. We rely on
the Sosemanuk core itself to provide some security margins (the output
of Serpent24 is not available directly to the attacker). Two consecutive
outputs of data are spaced with six inner rounds in order to prevent the
existence of relations between the bits of the initial state and the secret
key bits which could be used in an attack.
3.2 LFSR
The SNOW 2.0 LFSR contains 16 elements, which means 512 bits of
internal state. Since we aim only at 128-bit security, we can accommodate
a shorter LFSR. To defeat time-memory-data trade-off attacks, 256 bits
of internal state at least should be used; we wanted some security margin,
hence an LFSR length a bit more than six words.
LFSR length. The LFSR length n must be as small as possible: the bigger
the state, the more difficult it is to map the state values on the proces-
sor registers. Ideally, the total state should fit in the 16 general-purpose
registers that the new AMD64 architecture offers.
For efficient LFSR implementation, the LFSR must not be physically
shifted; moving data around contributes nothing to actual security, and
takes time. If n is the LFSR length, then kn steps (for some integer k)
must be “unrolled”, so that at each step only one LFSR cell is modified.
Moreover, since Serpent1 operates over four successive output values, kn
corresponds to lcm(4, n) and it should be kept as small as possible, since
a higher code size increases code cache pressure.
These considerations led us to n = 8 or 10. But, an LFSR of length
eight presents potential weaknesses which may be exploited in a guess-
and-determine attack (see Section 4.3). Therefore, a LFSR of length 10
is a suitable choice: the 384-bit internal state length should be enough;
only 20 steps need to be unrolled for an efficient implementation. The
total internal state fits in 12 registers, which should map fine on the new
AMD64 architecture.
Feedback polynomial. The design criteria for the feedback polynomial are
similar to those used in SNOW 2.0. Since the feedback polynomial must
be as sparse as possible, we chose as in SNOW 2.0 a primitive polynomial
of the form
pi(X) = c0X
10 + caX
n−a + cbX
n−b + 1 ,
where 0 < a < b < 10. The coefficients c0, ca and cb preferably lie in
{1, α, α−1} which are the elements corresponding to an efficient multipli-
cation in F232 . Moreover, {c0, ca, cb} must contain at least two distinct
non-binary elements; otherwise, a multiple of pi with binary coefficients
can be easily constructed [11, 16], providing an equation which holds for
each single bit position.
We also want a and b to be coprime with the LFSR length. Otherwise,
for instance if d = gcd(a, 10) > 1, the corresponding recurrence relation
st+10 = cbst+b + cast+a + c0st
involves three terms of a decimated sequence (sdt+i)t>0 (for some inte-
ger i), which can be generated by an LFSR of length n/d [23]. These
conditions led us to a = 3 and b = 9. Since a and b are not coprime, ca
and cb must be different; otherwise, some simplified relations may be ex-
hibited by manipulating the feedback polynomial as shown in [16, 9]. The
values c0 = α, c3 = α
−1 and c9 = 1 correspond to a suitable primitive
polynomial that fulfills all previously mentioned conditions.
3.3 FSM
The Trans function. The Trans function is chosen according to the follow-
ing implementation criteria: no static data tables in order to reduce the
cache pressure and the function must be fast on modern processors. For
these reasons, the Trans function is composed of a 32-bit multiplication
and a bitwise rotation which are both very fast. The 32-bit multiplica-
tion provides excellent “data mixing” compared to the number of clock
cycles it consumes. The bitwise rotation avoids the existence of a linear
relation between the least-significant bits of the inputs and the output of
the FSM.
The operations involved in the Trans functions are incompatible with
the other operations used in the FSM (addition over Z232 , XOR opera-
tion). Actually, mixing operations on the ring and on the vector space
disables associativity and commutativity laws. For instance,
(M × (R2t−1 + st+1 mod 2
32) mod 232)<<<7
6=
(M × (R2t−1) mod 2
32)<<<7 + (M × (st+1) mod 2
32)<<<7 mod 2
32.
The mux operation. The mux operation aims at increasing the complex-
ity of fast correlation and algebraic attacks, since it decimates the FSM
input sequence in an irregular fashion. Moreover, this operation can be
implemented efficiently with either control bit extension and bitwise op-
erations, or an architecture specific “conditional move” opcode. Modern
C compilers know how to perform those optimizations when compiling
the C conditional ternary operator “?:”. This multiplexer is quite fast
and requires no jump.
It is fitting that both LFSR elements st+c and st+d (with c ≤ d) in the
mux operation are not involved in the recurrence relation. Otherwise the
complexity of guess-and-determine attacksmight be reduced. The distance
(d − c) between those elements must be coprime with the LFSR length
since they must not be expressed as a decimated sequence with a lower
linear complexity. Here, we choose d−c = 7. Finally, it must be impossible
for the inputs of the mux operation at two different steps correspond
to the same element in the LFSR sequence. For this reason, the mux
operation outputs either st+c or st+c ⊕ st+d. If st+c ⊕ st+d is the input of
the FSM at time t, the possible inputs at time (t + d − c) are st+d and
st+d⊕ st+2d−c, which do not match any previous input. It is worth noticy
that this property does not hold anymore if the mux outputs either st+c
or st+d.
3.4 The output transformation
The output transformation derived from Serpent1 aims at mixing four
successive outputs of the FSM in a nonlinear way. As a consequence, any
32-bit keystream word produced by Sosemanuk depends on four consec-
utive intermediate values ft. As a result, recovering any single output of
the FSM, ft, in a guess-and-determine attack requires the knowledge of at
least four consecutive words from the LFSR sequence, st, st+1, st+2, st+3
(see Section 4.3 for details).
The following properties have also been taken into account in the
choice of output transformation.
– Both nonlinear mixing operations involved in Sosemanuk (the Trans
operation and the Serpent1 used in bitslice mode) do not provide any
correlation probability or linear property on the least significant bits
that could be used to mount an attack (see Section 4.4 for further
details).
– From an algebraic point of view, those operations are combined to
produce nonlinear equations (see Section 4.6).
– No linear relation can be directly exploited on the least significant bit
of the values (ft, ft+1, ft+2, ft+3), only quadratic equations with more
variables than the number of possible equations (see Section 4.4).
– The linear relation between st and Serpent1 (ft, ft+1, ft+2, ft+3) pre-
vents Sosemanuk from SQUARE-like attacks.
Finally, the fastest SERPENT S-box (S2) has been chosen in Serpent1
from an efficiency point of view [22]. But, S2 also guarantees that there
is no differential-linear relation on the least significant bit (the “most
linear” one in the output of the FSM).
4 Resistance against known attacks
Our stream cipher Sosemanuk offers a 128-bit security, based on the
following security model.
4.1 Security model
The attacker is a probabilistic Turing Machine with access to a black box
(oracle) that accepts the following three instructions: Reset, Init with
a 128-bit input, GetStream with a 1-bit output. The attacker’s goal is
to distinguish with probability 2/3 between a black box that generates
random output, and a black box that implements the stream cipher, where
Reset generates a random key, Init initializes the internal state of the
stream cipher with a new chosen IV, and GetStream generates the next
bit of keystream. The attacker is allowed to do 2128 elementary operations,
an instruction to the black box being an elementary operation.
This security model falls under remarks made by Hong and Sarkar [18],
because the precomputation time is not bounded by our model. Therefore
our claim is that the 256-bit key variant of Sosemanuk provide a 128-
bit security. We do not know of a formal security model that restricts
the precomputation time, i.e. that only allows the attacker one of the
probabilistic Turing machines that can be built in a reasonable time from
the current content of today’s computers. Therefore, our claim is that
the 128-bit key variant of Sosemanuk, and all variants with larger keys,
provide a 128-bit security against an attacker that is not allowed to benefit
from large precomputation.
The following sections focus on the security of Sosemanuk against
known attacks. It is important to note that the secret key of the cipher
cannot be easily recovered from the initial state of the generator. Once the
initial state is recovered, the attacker is only able to generate the output
sequence for a particular key and a given IV. Recovering the secret key
or generating the output for a different IV additionally requires the cost
of an attack on Serpent24 with a certain number of plaintext/ciphertext
pairs.
4.2 Time-memory-data tradeoff attacks
Due to the choice of the length of the LFSR (more than twice the key
length), the time-memory-data tradeoff attacks described in [2, 14, 5] are
impracticable. Moreover, since these TMDTO attacks aim at recovering
the internal state of the cipher, recovering the secret key requires the
additional cost of an attack against Serpent24. The best time-memory
data tradeoff attack is the Hellman’s one [17] which aims at recovering a
pair (K, IV ). For a 128-bit secret key and a 128-bit IV, its time complexity
is equal to 2128 cipher operations (see [18] for further details).
4.3 Guess and determine attacks
The main weaknesses of SNOW 1.0 are related to this type of attacks (two
at least have been exhibited [16], [9]). They essentially exploit a particular
weakness in the linear recurrence equation. This does not hold anymore
for the new polynomial choice in SNOW 2.0 and for the polynomial used
in Sosemanuk which involve non-binary multiplications by two different
constants. The first attack [16] also exploited a “trick” coming from the
dependence between the values R1t−1 and R1t. This trick is avoided in
SNOW 2.0 (because there is no direct link between those two register
values anymore) and in Sosemanuk.
The best guess and determine attack we have found on Sosemanuk
is the following.
– Guess at time t, st, st+1, st+2, st+3, R1t−1 and R2t−1 (6 words).
– Compute the corresponding outputs of the FSM (ft, ft+1, ft+2, ft+3).
– ComputeR2t = Trans(R1t−1) andR1t from Equation (1) if lsb(R1t−1) =
1 (this can be done only with probability 1/2).
– From ft = (st+9 +R1t mod 2
32)⊕R2t, compute st+9.
– Compute R1t+1 from the knowledge of both st+2 and st+9; compute
R2t+1. Compute st+10 from ft+1, R1t+1 and R2t+1.
– Compute R1t+2 from st+3 and st+10; compute R2t+2. Compute st+11
from ft+2, R1t+2 and R2t+2. Now, st+4 can be recovered due to the
feedback relation at time t+ 1:
α−1st+4 = st+11 ⊕ st+10 ⊕ αst+1 .
– Compute R1t+3 from st+4 and st+11; compute R2t+2. Compute st+12
from ft+3, R1t+3 and R2t+3. Compute st+5 by the feedback relation
at time t+ 2:
α−1st+5 = st+12 ⊕ st+11 ⊕ αst+2 .
At this point, the LFSR words st, st+1, st+2, st+3, st+4, st+5, st+9 are
known. Three elements (st+6, st+7, st+8) remain unknown. To complete
the full 10 words state of the LFSR, we need to guess 2 more words, st+6
and st+7 since each ft+i, 4 ≤ i ≤ 7, depends on all 4 words st+4, st+5,
st+6 and st+7. Therefore, this attack requires the guess of 8 32-bit words,
leading to a complexity of 2256.
Note that in [1] and in [25] the authors respectively proposed two
guess and determine attacks against Sosemanuk that have a complexity
approximatively equal to 2226 and 2224 computations. However, as stated
in paragraphs 2.6, 3.2 and 4.1, we never intended to have more than
128-bit security. The internal state of Sosemanuk is 384-bit long, which
would be bad practice if we aimed at 256-bit security. Therefore, those
guess-and-determine attacks, while being interesting theoretical studies,
do not compromise the security of Sosemanuk.
4.4 Correlation attacks
In order to find a relevant correlation in Sosemanuk, the following ques-
tions can be addressed:
– does there exist a linear relation at bit level between some input and
output bits?
– does there exist a particular relation between some input bit vector
and some output bit vector?
In the first case, two linear relations could be exhibited at the bit level.
In the first, the least significant bit of st+9 was “conserved”, since the
modular addition over Z232 is a linear operation on the least significant
bit. The second linear relation induced by the FSM concerns the least
significant bit of st+1 or of st+1 ⊕ st+8 (used to compute R1t) or the
seventh bit of R2t computed from st or of st ⊕ st+7. We here use that
R2t = Trans(R1t−1) and R1t−1 = R2t−2 + (st or (st ⊕ st+7)) mod 2
32.
No linear relation holds after applying Serpent1 and there are too
many unknown bits to exploit a relation on the outputs words due to the
bitslice design. Moreover, a fast correlation attack seems to be imprac-
ticable because the mux operation prevents certainty in the dependence
between the LFSR states and the observed keystream.
4.5 Distinguishing attacks
A distinguishing attack by D. Coppersmith, S. Halevi and C. Jutla (see
[10]) against the first version of SNOW used a particular weakness of the
feedback polynomial built on a single multiplication by α. This property
does not hold for the choice of the new polynomial in SNOW 2.0 and for
the polynomial used in Sosemanuk where multiplication by α−1 is also
included.
In [26], D. Watanabe, A. Biryukov and C. De Cannie`re have mounted
a new distinguishing attack on SNOW 2.0 with a complexity about 2225
operations using multiple linear masking method. They construct 3 dif-
ferent masks Γ1 = Γ , Γ2 = Γ · α and Γ3 = Γ · α
−1 based on the same
linear relation Γ .
The linear property deduced from the masks Γi (i = 1, 2 or 3) must
hold with a high probability on the both following quantities: Γi ·S
′(x) =
Γi · x and Γi · z ⊕ Γi · t = Γi · (z ⊞ t) for i=1,2 and 3, where S
′ is the
transition function of the FSM in SNOW 2.0. In the case of SNOW 2.0,
the hardest hypothesis to satisfy is the first one defined on y = S′(x). In
the case of Sosemanuk, we need Pr(Γi · Trans(x) = Γi · x)i=1,2,3 to be
high. But, we also need that ∀i = 1, 2, 3, the relation
(Γ ′i , Γ
′
i , Γ
′
i , Γ
′
i ) ·(x1, x2, x3, x4) = Serpent1 ((Γi, Γi, Γi, Γi) ·(x1, x2, x3, x4)) .
for some Γ ′i ∈ F
32
2 , holds with a high probability.
Due to the bitslice design chosen for Serpent1, it seems very difficult
to find such a mask. Therefore, the attack described in [26] could not be
applied directly on Sosemanuk.
4.6 Algebraic attacks
Let us consider, as in [4], the initial state of the LFSR at bit level:
(s10, · · · , s1) = (s
31
10, · · · , s
0
10, · · · , s
31
1 , · · · , s
0
1)
Then, the outputs of Sosemanuk at time t ≥ 1 could be written:
F t((s1031, · · · , s
1
0)) = (zt, zt+1, zt+2, zt+3)
where F is a vectorial Boolean function from F3202 into F
128
2 that could be
seen as 128 Boolean functions Fj , ∀j ∈ [0..127] from F
320
2 into F2.
Let us study the degree of an Fj function depending on a particular
bit of the output or on a linear combination of output bits because it is
not possible to directly compute the algebraic immunity of each function
Fj due to the very large number of variables (320 input bits). We think
that the following remarks prevent the existence of low degree relations
between the inputs and the outputs of Fj .
– The output bit i after the modular addition on Z232 is of degree i+1
(as described in [6]).
– The output bit i after the Trans mapping is of degree i+1−7 mod 32, ∀i 6=
6 and equal to 32 for i = 6 (as described in [6]).
– The mux operation does not enable to determine with probability one
the exact number of bits of the initial state involved in the algebraic
relation.
– The algebraic immunity of the SERPENT S-box S2 at 4-bit word level
is equal to 2 (see [21] for a definition of the algebraic immunity and
more details).
Under those remarks, we think that an algebraic attack against Sose-
manuk is intractable.
5 Implementation
The reference C implementation is also an optimized implementation.
When compiled with the SOSEMANUK_VECTOR macro defined, it is a full
program (with its own main() function) which outputs two detailed test
vectors. Since the LFSR length is ten, we unroll the C code on 20 rounds
(see 3.2 for details); each test vector contains:
– A copy of the secret key (a sequence of bytes, expressed in hexadeci-
mal).
– The expanded secret key, as described by the SERPENT specification:
the key is expanded to 256 bits, then read as a 256-bit number with
the little endian convention. The test vector outputs that key as a big
hexadecimal number, with some digit grouping.
– The 25 Serpent24 subkeys, each of them consisting of four 32-bit words
(in the (K3,K2,K1,K0) order).
– The 128-bit IV, as a sequence of 16 bytes.
– The IV, once transformed into four 32-bit words, in the (I3, I2, I1, I0)
order.
– The initial LFSR state (s1 to s10, in that order).
– The initial FSM state (R10 and R20).
– Ten times the following data:
• Four times the following:
∗ the new FSM state (R1t and R2t);
∗ the new LFSR state, after the update (the dropped value st is
also output);
∗ the intermediate output ft.
• The Serpent1 input.
• The Serpent1 output.
• 16 bytes of Sosemanuk output.
– The total stream output (160 bytes).
6 Performance
6.1 Software implementation
This section is devoted to the software performance of Sosemanuk. It
compares the performance of Sosemanuk with the other candidates se-
lected in the Phase 3 (Software Profile), SNOW 2.0 and AES-CTR using
the eSTREAM testing framework and the provided reference C imple-
mentations [7]. The three tables Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 sum up the
results (for the keystream generation, the IV setup and the key setup)
given in [8] for three different architectures: an Intel Pentium 4 (CISC
target), an AMD Athlon64 X2 4200+ (CISC target) and an Alpha EV6
(RISC target).
All the results presented for Sosemanuk have been computed using
the supplied reference C implementation.
Code size. The main unrolled loop implies a code size between 2 and 5
KB depending on the platform and the compiler. Therefore, the entire
code fits in the L1 cache.
Static data. The reference C implementation uses static data tables with
a total size equal to 4 KB. This amount is 3 times smaller than the size of
static data required in SNOW 2.0, leading to a lower date cache pressure.
Key setup. We recall that the key setup (the subkey generation given by
Serpent24 ) is made once and that each new IV injection for a given key
corresponds to a small version of the block cipher SERPENT.
The performance of the key setup and of the IV setup in Sosemanuk
are directly derived from the performance of SERPENT [13]. Due to
intellectual property aspects, our reference implementation does not re-
use the best implementation of SERPENT. However, the performance
given in [20] (i.e., computed on the Gladman’s code written in assembly
language [13]) leads to the following results on a Pentium 4:
– key setup ≃ 900 cycles;
– IV setup ≃ 480 cycles.
These estimations for the IV setup (resp. key setup) performance corre-
sponds to about 3/4 of the best published performance for SERPENT
encryption (resp. for SERPENT key schedule).
Performance results. Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 present the perfor-
mance of the keystream generation (using four performance measures),
the agility, the IV setup and the key setup to test the most relevant imple-
mentation properties. The four elementary tests for keystream generation
are: the encryption rate for long streams by ciphering a long stream in
chunks of about 4Kb; the packet encryption rate for three packet lengths
(40, 576 and 1500 bytes) including an IV setup; the agility test initiates
a large number of sessions (filling 16MB of RAM), and then encrypts
streams of plaintexts in short blocks of around 256 bytes, each time jump-
ing from one session to another.
cycles/byte cycles/key cycles/IV
Algo. Key IV Stream 40 bytes 576 bytes 1500 bytes agility Key setup IV setup
AES CTR 128 128 17.81 29.19 18.35 18.04 20.77 393.45 76.16
SNOW v2.0 128 128 5.04 35.60 6.92 5.92 7.95 85.44 1000.54
CryptMT (v3) 128 128 5.27 39.12 12.09 11.55 11.35 53.71 849.25
DRAGON 128 128 11.37 74.09 26.07 23.23 15.00 256.04 1925.54
HC-128 128 128 3.76 1458.58 104.86 42.64 19.02 78.81 56929.45
HC-256 128 128 4.39 2596.20 184.25 73.59 26.27 76.66 104341.33
LEXv1 128 128 9.46 20.78 10.88 10.01 12.30 486.57 449.00
NLSv2 128 128 6.64 38.94 8.52 6.97 12.10 823.74 704.68
Rabbit 128 64 9.46 34.45 11.77 10.76 12.89 984.27 825.55
Salsa20 128 64 16.61 42.21 17.63 18.57 18.71 90.32 78.19
SOSEMANUK 128 64 5.81 52.37 12.52 9.62 7.40 1287.55 1245.71
Table 1. Number of CPU cycles for the stream ciphers using a Pentium 4 at 2.80GHz,
Model 15/2/9
As shown in these tables, Sosemanuk remains among the fastest
algorithms on several platforms due to a good design for the mappings of
data on the processor registers and a low data cache pressure.
6.2 Hardware implementation
In [15], the authors propose hardware implementations and performance
metrics for several stream cipher candidates and especially Sosemanuk.
They remark that even if the design of Sosemanuk is a little bit complex
to implement, it leads to an impressive performance. The required number
of gates for designing Sosemanuk on 0.13 µm Standard Cell CMOS with
a key of length 256 bits is 18819 considering that 32 bits are outputted at
each cycle. Moreover, the corresponding leakage power is 33.55 µW for a
cycles/byte cycles/key cycles/IV
Algo. Key IV Stream 40 bytes 576 bytes 1500 bytes agility Key setup IV setup
AES CTR 128 128 13.39 18.09 13.39 13.35 15.03 152.81 15.58
SNOW v2.0 128 128 4.83 23.18 5.77 5.34 6.46 43.37 528.04
CryptMT (v3) 128 128 4.65 19.26 8.47 7.64 8.82 25.47 384.33
DRAGON 128 128 7.76 60.20 25.90 24.31 10.01 89.90 1449.74
HC-128 128 128 2.86 587.00 43.19 18.43 13.07 37.85 23308.78
HC-256 128 128 4.72 1420.99 103.10 42.83 21.13 41.31 56725.89
LEXv1 128 128 6.84 14.19 7.78 7.20 9.19 226.41 268.31
NLSv2 128 128 10.69 53.24 13.45 11.48 14.13 453.35 1293.15
Rabbit 128 64 4.98 14.60 5.55 5.25 6.34 288.21 292.38
Salsa20 128 64 7.64 16.10 7.74 7.91 8.93 24.57 14.29
SOSEMANUK 128 64 4.07 25.26 7.20 6.10 5.12 759.06 560.63
Table 2. Number of CPU cycles for the stream ciphers using an AMD Athlon 64 X2
4200+ at 2.20GHz, Model 15/75/2
cycles/byte cycles/key cycles/IV
Algo. Key IV Stream 40 bytes 576 bytes 1500 bytes agility Key setup IV setup
AES CTR 128 128 15.53 24.63 15.94 15.82 17.80 633.65 37.58
SNOW v2.0 128 128 5.17 23.74 6.11 5.73 6.37 69.00 489.35
CryptMT (v3) 128 128 6.90 24.74 11.64 11.75 12.86 37.49 422.17
DRAGON 128 128 8.46 74.94 41.89 40.52 10.13 234.33 1542.46
HC-128 128 128 3.90 1029.93 77.41 31.59 14.80 54.67 42130.00
HC-256 128 128 5.18 2414.77 171.48 69.34 23.53 52.96 95937.00
LEXv1 128 128 7.99 16.87 9.15 8.44 9.53 198.49 334.58
NLSv2 128 128 5.93 24.26 6.44 5.59 7.94 530.39 421.66
Rabbit 128 64 5.27 14.49 5.69 5.53 6.32 318.57 280.63
Salsa20 128 64 13.61 39.93 13.77 14.34 14.46 33.60 20.16
SOSEMANUK 128 64 4.63 28.80 7.66 6.26 5.32 1301.09 692.71
Table 3. Number of CPU cycles for the stream ciphers using an Alpha EV6 at 500MHz,
Model 21264
total power at 10MHz equal to 812.47 µW. The authors also derive the
metrics for maximum clock frequency and for an output rate at 10 Mbps
(estimated typical future wireless LAN). In this last case, the correspond-
ing clock frequency is equal to 0.313 MHz for a Power-Area-Time equal
to 564.8 nJ-um2. In conclusion, they recommend Sosemanuk for WLAN
applications with a key length equal to 256 bits. They say that “with
regard to Sosemanuk, the utility as a hardware cipher is clear thus in
our opinion requires adding to the hardware focus profile.”
7 Strengths and advantages of Sosemanuk
The new synchronous stream cipher Sosemanuk based upon the SNOW
2.0 design improves it from several points of view. From a security point of
view, Sosemanuk avoids some potential weaknesses as the distinguishing
attack proposed in [26] due to the particular use of Serpent1 in bitslice
mode. The chosen LFSR is designed to eliminate all potential weaknesses
(particular decimation properties, linear relations,...). The mappings used
in the Finite State Machine have been carefully designed in the following
way:
– The Trans function guarantees good properties of confusion and dif-
fusion for a low cost in software. Moreover, this mapping prevents
Sosemanuk from algebraic attacks.
– The mux operation, that could be efficiently implemented, protects
Sosemanuk from fast correlation attacks and algebraic attacks.
The Serpent1 output transformation, very efficient in bitslice mode,
provides nonlinear equations, a good diffusion and it improves the resis-
tance to guess-and-determine attacks.
The new design chosen for the key setup and the IV injection allows
to split the initialization procedure into two distinct parts, without any
loss of security. It leads to a much faster resynchronization mechanism.
From an efficiency point of view, due to a reduced amount of static
data and a reduced internal state size, the exploitation of the processor
registers is enhanced and the data cache pressure is improved on several
platforms, especially on RISC architectures.
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A Specifications of SERPENT
In this appendix, a recall on the specifications of SERPENT given in [3]
is made. First, the S-boxes definition is given and the linear part is also
defined again.
A.1 S-boxes definitions
The eight SERPENT S-boxes act on 4-bit words and are defined as per-
mutations of Z16:
S0 : 3, 8, 15, 1, 10, 6, 5, 11, 14, 13, 4, 2, 7, 0, 9, 12
S1 : 15, 12, 2, 7, 9, 0, 5, 10, 1, 11, 14, 8, 6, 13, 3, 4
S2 : 8, 6, 7, 9, 3, 12, 10, 15, 13, 1, 14, 4, 0, 11, 5, 2
S3 : 0, 15, 11, 8, 12, 9, 6, 3, 13, 1, 2, 4, 10, 7, 5, 14
S4 : 1, 15, 8, 3, 12, 0, 11, 6, 2, 5, 4, 10, 9, 14, 7, 13
S5 : 15, 5, 2, 11, 4, 10, 9, 12, 0, 3, 14, 8, 13, 6, 7, 1
S6 : 7, 2, 12, 5, 8, 4, 6, 11, 14, 9, 1, 15, 13, 3, 10, 0
S7 : 1, 13, 15, 0, 14, 8, 2, 11, 7, 4, 12, 10, 9, 3, 5, 6
A.2 Linear part of SERPENT round function
The linear part of a one round version of SERPENT acts on 4 32-bit words
(X3,X2,X1,X0) where X0 is the least significant word and is defined as
follows:
X0 = X0 <<<13
X2 = X2 <<<3
X1 = X1 ⊕X0 ⊕X2
X3 = X3 ⊕X2 ⊕ (X0 <<<3)
X1 = X1 <<<1
X3 = X3 <<<7
X0 = X0 ⊕X1 ⊕X3
X2 = X2 ⊕X3 ⊕ (X1 <<<7)
X0 = X0 <<<5
X2 = X2 <<<22
